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Tort Lite? — Vancouver (City) v. Ward
and the Availability of Damages for
Charter Infringements
Robert E. Charney and Josh Hunter*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort cases are all about damages. Historically at least, constitutional
cases have been about declarations, not damages. This is not to say that
vast sums of money have not been at stake in constitutional cases.
Constitutional cases relating to the validity of fees and taxes have put in
issue millions and potentially billions of dollars.1 Similarly, Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 section 15 cases seeking the expansion
of government funded benefit programs such as education,3 health care,4
and social assistance5 usually involve many millions of dollars of annual
government funding.
Governments have, since the abolition of Crown immunity from tort
by the Proceedings Against the Crown Acts,6 been subject to damages for
*

General Counsel and Counsel, respectively, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the
Attorney General of Ontario. The authors were counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario in
Vancouver v. Ward in the Supreme Court of Canada. The views expressed herein are solely those of
the authors and do not represent the position of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. The
authors would like to thank Jessica Eisen and Rochelle Fox for their contributions to the legal
analysis advanced in this paper. This paper was originally presented at the Osgoode Professional
Development 7th Annual Conference on Crown Liability, February 18, 2011.
1
Re Eurig Estate, [1998] S.C.J. No. 72, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565 (S.C.C.); Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 1
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eurig”].
2
Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.).
4
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No.
71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2004 SCC 78 (S.C.C.).
5
Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363, 134
D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002]
4 S.C.R. 429, 2002 SCC 84 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin v. Quebec”].
6
These Acts which have been passed by all of the common law Canadian jurisdictions are
modelled on the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (U.K.), 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44. In Ontario, Crown

394

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

torts committed by their servants and agents. Thus, the ability of courts
to order the government to pay damages was hardly a new issue when
the question of Charter damages finally reached the Supreme Court of
Canada in the case of Vancouver (City) v. Ward.7 Indeed, it was already
common practice for plaintiffs suing governments for the alleged tortious
conduct of their servants and agents to plead that the conduct complained
of was both a common-law tort and a violation of the Charter and to
claim damages on both grounds. The fact that tort law and section 7 of
the Charter are both designed to protect “life, liberty, and security of the
person” meant that much tortious conduct committed by government
officials would also constitute an infringement of the Charter.8 In most
such cases, the ability to prove the tort claim rendered the Charter claim
redundant; the corollary was that the inability to prove the tort claim
meant that the Charter claim would also fail.
There never has been any doubt that section 24(1) of the Charter authorizes the courts to order the government to pay damages in cases in
which damages are an “appropriate and just” remedy.9 The real question
has always been whether damages might be a just and appropriate
remedy for a Charter violation even if the conduct complained of does
not also qualify as a tort.
Mr. Ward alleged that his Charter rights were infringed by the police
unlawfully detaining and arresting him and seizing his property and by
provincial correctional officers unlawfully strip searching him and
imprisoning him. These are all claims which, if pursued as the comparable torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery and conversion, would require proof of the appropriate level of fault for each tort.
The issue in the Ward case was whether the same level of fault should
have been required when they were pursued as alleged breaches of the
Charter.
immunity for torts committed by Crown servants and agents was abolished as of September 1, 1963
by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, 1962-63, S.O. 1962-63, c. 109, now the Proceedings
Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27. Before the passing of these Acts, the Crown could only
be sued in tort with its consent, obtained through a petition of right. See Peter W. Hogg & Patrick J.
Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2000), at 108-14 [hereinafter
“Hogg & Monahan”].
7
[2010] S.C.J. No. 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward
(S.C.C.)”].
8
Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.); Miazga v. Kvello
Estate, [2009] S.C.J. No. 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, 2009 SCC 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Miazga”].
9
Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Schachter”].
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Ward was the first case in the Supreme Court of Canada where the
lower courts had dismissed the tort claim but allowed damages under the
Charter, thus transforming Charter damages into a “consolation prize” for
plaintiffs whose claims, as a result of the law, the evidence or the
pleadings, did not meet the applicable tort law standard. While the
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court appears to uphold this approach, we believe that a closer reading of the decision indicates that the
Court did not stray very far from basic tort law principles. The lower
court decisions appear to adopt a “strict liability” approach to certain
Charter claims, but the Supreme Court’s reasons indicate that something
more than mere causation will have to be proven before Charter damages
will be considered “appropriate and just”.

II. THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 1, 2002 THAT LED TO MR. WARD
SUING VANCOUVER AND BRITISH COLUMBIA
On August 16, 2000, a protester in Charlottetown threw a pie in the
face of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.10 Two years later, police officers
responsible for ensuring the Prime Minister’s safety as he opened the
Millennium Gate in Vancouver’s Chinatown received reports that another
attempt would be made to “pie” the Prime Minister during the ceremony.11
A. Cameron Ward is a well-known Vancouver lawyer who, according
to his biography on his firm’s website, “has a particular interest in social
justice issues and has represented a number of activists who have
become involved in legal proceedings”.12 Mr. Ward decided to attend the
Millennium Gate opening ceremony. He parked his car near the ceremony, listened to the beginning of the Prime Minister’s speech, and then
began to head south on nearby Taylor Street.13
Shortly before he did so, a Vancouver police officer assigned to liaise
with the R.C.M.P. announced over the police radio that a white male had
been overheard planning to throw a pie at the Prime Minister. A description was given that, although it did contain certain elements similar to
Mr. Ward’s appearance, generally did not match his appearance. A
10

Online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2000/08/16/peiChretienPie16aug00.html.>
Ward v. Vancouver (City), [2007] B.C.J. No. 9, 63 B.C.L.R. (4th) 361, 2007 BCSC 3, at
para. 1 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Ward (B.C.S.C.)”].
12
Online: <http://www.cameronward.com/biographies/.>
13
Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 5.
11
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second broadcast from an unidentified officer followed stating that a
male matching the description was running southward on Taylor Street.
Mr. Ward was arrested on Taylor Street a few minutes after this broadcast
was made but his and the officers’ versions of what occurred before his
arrest differ significantly.14
Mr. Ward testified that he was heading down Taylor Street to gain a
better vantage point of a protester holding a sign behind the Prime
Minister because he wanted to see how the man would be treated by
police. He was stopped by a police officer who asked him for identification but told the officer that he did not have to provide any identification.
After the officer called for back-up, several more officers arrived and
handcuffed him. The officers would not tell him whether he was under
arrest or allow him to call a lawyer using his cell phone despite his
repeated requests to do so. He denies ever raising his voice until after he
was arrested.15
The officers testified that Mr. Ward was stopped because he was running down Tyson Street like the man described in the second broadcast.
When stopped, he started screaming hysterically and spitting at the officers
as they tried to investigate whether he had been involved in a “pieing”
attempt. A crowd, including media representatives, had gathered and Mr.
Ward directed his yelling at them. Mr. Ward was handcuffed because the
arresting officer was concerned he would escape or assault the officer. Mr.
Ward was escorted to a nearby “paddy wagon” and transported to jail.16
The police had Mr. Ward’s car towed to a police compound for the purpose
of searching it once a warrant had been obtained but later decided they did
not have grounds to obtain a warrant.17
The jail was a jointly run facility staffed by provincial correctional
officers and one city police officer. When Mr. Ward first arrived at the
jail, he was put in a holding cell. A few minutes later, he was taken to a
room by two correctional officers who told him to remove his clothes in
accordance with the jail’s policy that all new entrants would be strip
searched with the exception of by-law offenders and drunken persons.
Mr. Ward removed all of his clothes except for his underwear. When he
objected to removing them, he was not forced to do so. Mr. Ward was
then placed in a small cell by himself where he stayed for the next
14
15
16
17

Id., at paras. 5-6.
Id., at paras. 7-10.
Id., at paras. 11-23.
Id. at para. 31.
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several hours, except for when he was allowed to call his lawyers.18
Approximately four-and-a-half hours after Mr. Ward was arrested (and
several hours after the Prime Minister had left), Mr. Ward was released
without charge.19

III. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Ward publicly demanded an apology from the Vancouver Police
Department and lodged a complaint with the Police Complaint Commissioner. His complaint was dismissed and he never received an apology.20
Mr. Ward therefore brought an action against the City of Vancouver
(which was vicariously liable for the actions of the Vancouver police
officers) and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British Columbia (who
was vicariously liable for the actions of the provincial correctional
officers). He sought damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment,
negligence and breaches of his sections 7, 8 and 9 Charter rights.21
1. The Trial Decision
Justice Tysoe, as he then was, found that Mr. Ward had been running
down Tyler Street when the officers stopped him and did start yelling and
creating a disturbance. He found that the officers arrested Mr. Ward for
breach of the peace, but not for assault or attempted assault. He was only
under investigation for those possible offences.22
Justice Tysoe found that the police had reasonable grounds to detain
Mr. Ward for investigative purposes. The initial detention was therefore
lawful and not a breach of Mr. Ward’s section 9 rights.23 Similarly, the
handcuffing of Mr. Ward was not an assault or battery as the officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ward might escape or assault
him.24 He went on to find that the police had reasonable and probable
grounds to arrest Mr. Ward without a warrant for breach of the peace

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at paras. 24-30.
Id., at para. 32.
Id., at para. 34.
Id., at para. 3.
Id., at paras. 37-46.
Id., at paras. 52-56.
Id., at para. 56.
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because he was creating a disturbance in a public place.25 They would
not, however, have had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for
assault or attempted assault.26 Nevertheless, as the arrest was a lawful
arrest for breach of the peace, the arrest and transfer to the jail was not an
assault, a battery, or a breach of Mr. Ward’s section 9 rights.27
The police were not, however, entitled to continue detaining Mr.
Ward for a breach of the peace after the Prime Minister had left the
vicinity. As they had no other grounds to continue detaining him, Tysoe
J. found that he had been falsely imprisoned for three and a half to four
hours which was also a breach of his section 9 Charter rights.28
The trial judge concluded that it was unreasonable to strip search all
new entrants (except by-law offenders and drunken individuals) as a
matter of course even if, like Mr. Ward, no decision had been made to
charge them and they were not going to mix with the general prison
population. He determined that Mr. Ward’s strip search was not conducted in accordance with the written provincial policy governing strip
searches (or if it was, that the policy itself was unreasonable) and
therefore breached Mr. Ward’s section 8 Charter rights.29
Justice Tysoe dismissed a claim that the police officer in charge of
the jail assaulted Mr. Ward by threatening him and claims that he was
assaulted or battered during the strip search.30 Mr. Ward did not plead
assault or battery by the provincial correctional officers.31 The trial judge
also dismissed claims of negligence against the police and provincial
correctional officers on the basis that any duty owed by the city or the
province was a duty owed to the public at large and not a private law
duty owed to Mr. Ward which could give rise to damages. As well, no
evidence was presented on the applicable standard of care.32
The trial judge did find, however, that the seizure of Mr. Ward’s vehicle constituted a breach of his section 8 Charter rights as there was no
reason to seize his car in connection with an arrest for breach of the

25

Id., at paras. 57-58.
Id., at paras. 59-65.
Id., at para. 65.
28
Id., at paras. 66-71.
29
Id., at paras. 72-86.
30
Id., at paras. 87-90.
31
Ward v. Vancouver (City), [2009] B.C.J. No. 91, 89 B.C.L.R. (4th) 217, 2009 BCCA 23,
at paras. 40-45 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ward (B.C.C.A.)”], per Low J.A.
32
Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at paras. 94-96.
26
27
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peace.33 Although Mr. Ward had also pleaded that the seizure of the car
constituted the tort of conversion, Tysoe J. did not address this issue in
his reasons.34
Justice Tysoe concluded that damages were an appropriate and just
remedy for the section 8 breaches caused by the strip search and the
seizure of the car in addition to a declaration that Mr. Ward’s rights had
been breached.35 He awarded $5,000 in general damages for false
imprisonment (to avoid double recovery, no damages were awarded for
the section 9 breach caused by the same facts), $5,000 for the section 8
breach caused by the strip search, and $100 for the section 8 breach
caused by the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car. He declined to award aggravated, exemplary or punitive damages.36
2. The Court of Appeal
Mr. Ward appealed the dismissal of his claim that the arrest by city
police was unlawful and the quantum of the damages awarded for false
imprisonment. The City of Vancouver cross-appealed, arguing that
damages should not have been awarded for the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car.
The province brought a separate appeal arguing that damages were not an
appropriate remedy for the breach of Mr. Ward’s section 8 Charter rights
caused by the strip search in the absence of any showing of fault on the
part of the correctional officers. Mr. Ward cross-appealed seeking greater
damages including punitive damages.37
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Low J.A., with Finch C.J.B.C.
concurring) agreed with Tysoe J. that the police had reasonable and
probable grounds to initially stop Mr. Ward and detain him briefly while
they investigated him. Mr. Ward did not dispute that his subsequent
behaviour constituted a breach of the peace. The majority therefore
upheld Tysoe J.’s finding that the arrest for breach of the peace was
lawful. It also found no error in Tysoe J.’s determination of the appropriate level of damages.38

33
34
35
36
37
38

Id., at paras. 91-93.
Ward (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 31, at paras. 33, per Low J.A., and 96, per Saunders J.A.
Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at paras. 105-113.
Id., at paras. 114-129.
Ward (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 31, at paras. 5-8.
Id., at paras. 13-27 and 67-70.
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Turning to the awards of Charter damages, the majority held that, as
no challenge had been made to the validity of any legislation, the
principle set out in Mackin that a section 24(1) remedy such as damages
cannot be combined with a declaration of invalidity under section 52
unless there is bad faith or an abuse of power did not apply.39 Nor
was the government policy as a whole challenged as was the case in
Wynberg.40 Rather, the Charter breach was caused by the conduct of the
correctional officers who had unreasonably interpreted the provincial
strip search policy as requiring a search of persons like Mr. Ward who
had not been charged with any offence and would not be placed in the
general prison population.41 The majority found that section 24(1) vested
the Court with a broad remedial jurisdiction to grant “such remedy as the
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances” whether or not
accompanied by a tort or bad faith.42 It therefore refused to interfere with
Tysoe J.’s determination that damages were appropriate on the facts of
the case or the quantum of damages he awarded.43
Justice Saunders in dissent agreed that Mr. Ward’s appeal and crossappeal should be dismissed but disagreed that Charter damages should
have been awarded in the absence of wilful malice or bad faith.44 He held
that if the policy itself had been unreasonable, the principle in Mackin
would have applied and damages should not have been awarded absent a
showing of bad faith or abuse of power.45 If the search was not conducted
in accordance with the policy, then the question was whether state action
that is not a tort or performed in bad faith should give rise to damages.
Justice Saunders held that, absent a tort, there needed to be something
more, such as a degree of deliberation, wilful blindness or bad faith,
before Charter damages could be awarded. Otherwise, there would be
strict liability for damages for a Charter breach.46 As Tysoe J. had
dismissed the negligence claim against the province and had found that
39
Id., at paras. 46-58; Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No.
13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, 2002 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mackin”].
40
Ward (B.C.C.A.), id., at para. 59; Wynberg v. Ontario, [2006] O.J. No. 2732, 82 O.R.
(3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 441 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Wynberg”].
41
Ward (B.C.C.A.), id., at paras. 62-63.
42
Id., at para. 64.
43
Id., at paras. 64-65.
44
Id., at para. 72.
45
Id., at para. 81.
46
Id., at paras. 82-90.
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the correctional officers “were not malicious, high-handed, or oppressive”, Saunders J.A. concluded that Charter damages should not have
been awarded for the strip search.47 Similarly, as none of the torts
pleaded against the city were made out, Charter damages should not have
been awarded for the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car.48
3. Supreme Court Decision
The City of Vancouver and British Columbia appealed the majority’s
decision upholding the award of Charter damages in the absence of a tort
or bad faith to the Supreme Court of Canada. Chief Justice McLachlin,
writing for the entire Court, held that proof of a tort or bad faith was not
a necessary prerequisite to the award of Charter damages. Instead, she set
out a four-part test for determining when damages would be an “appropriate and just” remedy under section 24(1).
The first step is to establish that there has been a breach of a substantive Charter right for which an individual remedy under section 24(1)
needs to be awarded.49 The second step, for which the onus also lies upon
the claimant, is to establish that damages would “serve a useful function
or purpose”. They do so if they would promote one or more of the
purposes of section 24(1): (1) compensating a claimant for a loss
suffered; (2) vindicating the harm caused to the state and to society by a
breach of a claimant’s Charter rights; and (3) deterring future breaches of
Charter rights.50
The third step of determining whether damages are “appropriate and
just in the circumstances” requires considering not only the claimant’s
interests, but also those of society as a whole. Therefore, even if the
claimant demonstrates that damages are a justifiable remedy because
they further one of the purposes of section 24(1), the government still has
an opportunity to show that other considerations render damages inappropriate or unjust. The Court left open for future cases the determination
of a complete catalogue of countervailing factors but did give two

47
48
49
50

Id., at paras. 82 and 89-91.
Id., at para. 96.
Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 23.
Id., at paras. 24-31.
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examples.51 The first was the existence of an alternative adequate remedy
such as an award of tort damages or a declaration of a Charter breach.52
The second countervailing factor the Court discussed is the concern
for effective governance. One example where effective governance
generally renders damages inappropriate is when government agents
enforce a law or policy that is later struck down as unconstitutional. The
Court reaffirmed the Mackin principle that damages should not be
awarded in such a case absent a showing of bad faith but found that the
principle did not apply to the facts of Mr. Ward’s case.53 The Court went
on to suggest that other situations might require heightened standards of
fault when the state establishes that section 24(1) damages raise governance
concerns but left the development of those standards for future cases.54
The final step is to determine the appropriate quantum of damages.
Where the objective of compensation is engaged, Charter damages, like
tort damages, are intended to restore the claimant to the position he or
she would have been in had the breach not engaged. Both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damages are compensable under the Charter although, by
analogy with tort damages, non-pecuniary damages are generally fixed at
a modest conventional rate.55 Damages intended to vindicate Charter
rights or deter future breaches will principally be determined by the
seriousness of the breach and must be fair to both the claimant and the
State. Although Charter damages may have a somewhat punitive effect
on the government, pure exemplary or punitive damages will only rarely
be awarded.56
On the facts of the Ward case, the Court agreed that the strip search
of Mr. Ward constituted a breach of his section 8 rights.57 It found that
his injury was serious as strip searches are inherently humiliating and
degrading and that the correctional officers’ conduct was serious as they
ignored “the settled law that routine strip searches are inappropriate
when the individual is being held for a short time in police cells, is not
mingling with the general prison population, and where the police have
no legitimate concerns that the individual is concealing weapons that
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id., at paras. 32-33.
Id., at paras. 34-37.
Id., at paras. 38-41.
Id., at paras. 42-43.
Id., at paras. 46-51.
Id., at paras. 52-57.
Id., at para. 62.
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could be used to harm themselves or others.”58 Damages therefore were
required to compensate Mr. Ward, vindicate the breach of his rights and
deter future breaches.59 British Columbia did not establish countervailing
factors — a declaration would not satisfy the need to compensate
Mr. Ward and no good governance considerations were demonstrated.60
Finally, the Court concluded that Tysoe J.’s award of $5,000 in damages
was reasonable.61 The Court, however, overturned the award of $100 in
damages for the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car. Compensation was not
engaged as Mr. Ward did not suffer any injury as a result of the seizure.
A declaration was adequate to vindicate the uncontested breach of
Mr. Ward’s section 8 rights and to deter future breaches.62

IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF TORT LIABILITY
In order to appreciate what was at stake in Ward and to understand
the significance of the Court’s decision, it is necessary to first consider
the principles of liability developed over the past 600 years in the
common law tort system. The common law gradually developed carefully balanced standards of fault to determine when a defendant who
causes harm to another should be held legally liable to compensate the
plaintiff for that harm. With a few narrow exceptions, mere causation has
not been sufficient to impose liability. Instead, the defendant must have
intended to carry out a tortious act or at least have been negligent in so
doing. When tort liability was extended to the Crown for the actions of
its servants and agents, it was made clear that the Crown would only be
liable if those servants and agents could have been found liable for a tort
— thus a showing of the requisite level of fault was required to sue the
Crown as well.63
Ontario, which intervened in Ward at the Supreme Court, took the
position that unless there are clearly articulated policy reasons to
depart from the fault requirements which the common law has developed in particular circumstances, a claim for Charter damages should
require at least the same level of fault as a private law tort claim in
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id., at para. 65.
Id., at paras. 64-66.
Id., at paras. 67-69.
Id., at paras. 70-73.
Id., at paras. 74-78.
See, e.g., Proceedings Against the Crown Act, supra, s. 5(2) and (4).
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those circumstances.64 Otherwise, Charter damages run the risk of
subsuming the entire field of tort law when a governmental actor is the
defendant. Such a result, Ontario argued, would run against the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence which has carefully delimited the scope of
governmental tort liability and has often required a higher, not a lower,
level of fault before a claim could be made out against a governmental
defendant. The constitutional requirement of an “appropriate and just”
remedy for Charter breaches can and should be read harmoniously with the
principles of common law tort liability which have been developed with
similar rights and policy interests in mind.
The tort system as it has developed in most common law jurisdictions is premised on the principle that causation alone is not a basis for
liability. Only where a defendant is at fault should there be liability.
Depending on the tort alleged, the level of fault required is usually
negligence or an intention to commit the tortious conduct.65
The courts refined and expanded the tort of negligence over several
centuries. They were careful, however, not to extend it to all situations in
which a defendant causes harm to another. In 1932, Lord Atkin famously
held that “in order to support an action for damages for negligence the
complainant has to show that he has been injured by the breach of a duty
owed to him in the circumstances by the defendant to take reasonable
care to avoid such injury.”66
In 1978, the House of Lords articulated a two-stage test for determining when such a duty of care was owed in Anns v. Merton London
Borough Council.67 The Supreme Court adopted the Anns standard in
Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen and has followed it ever since:
(1) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties (the
local authority and the person who has suffered the damage) so

64
This is not to suggest that claims for Charter damages should be limited to those common
law causes of action that existed before the Charter, only that “fault” should continue to be the test
for liability. For example, while there was no common law right to be free from discrimination and
no tort of wrongful discrimination, s. 24(1) of the Charter may authorize the Court to award damages
for government operational conduct that infringes s. 15 of the Charter where the appropriate level of
fault has been established.
65
The history of this development has been extensively reviewed in legal texts. See for
example: J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths,
2002), at 60-64 and 402-11 [hereinafter “Baker”].
66
Id., at 411-21; M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, at 579 (H.L.).
67
[1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.).
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that, in the reasonable contemplation of the authority, carelessness
on its part might cause damage to that person? If so,
(2) are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit (a)
the scope of the duty and (b) the class of persons to whom it is
owed or (c) the damages to which a breach of it may give rise?68

In addition to the existence of a duty of care toward the plaintiff, the
liability of the defendant almost always depends on proof of negligence
or wrongful intent. Generally, the relevant standard of care is the care a
reasonable person would take in similar circumstances. As the name
implies, intentional torts require an even higher level of fault — the
intention to carry out a certain act or omission.69
If negligence is alleged, the plaintiff must establish the three elements of the tort of negligence in order to be entitled to damages:
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care recognized by law;
(2) the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care expected of
it; and
(3) the defendant’s breach of duty caused (both in fact and in law) the
damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.70
If an intentional tort is alleged, the plaintiff must establish each of the
tort’s elements, including the required level of intention.71
The rare cases in which modern Canadian tort law holds defendants
liable for non-negligent and unintentional harm fall within two narrow
categories both of which involve the defendant having voluntarily chosen
to do something which is known to create an excessive risk of harming
68
Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, [1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 8-11 (S.C.C.),
citing Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, id., at 751-52; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003]
S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69, at paras. 45-47 and 51 (S.C.C.); Childs v.
Desormeaux, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 2006 SCC 18, at paras. 9-12 (S.C.C.);
Design Services Ltd. v. Canada, [2008] S.C.J. No. 22, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 737, 2008 SCC 22, at paras.
46-47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Design Services”]; R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] S.C.J.
No. 42, 2011 SCC 42, at paras. 38-39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”].
69
Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] S.C.J. No. ¸41,
[2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41, at paras. 68-73 (S.C.C.); Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] S.C.J.
No. 3, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, at 121 (S.C.C.); Lewis N. Klar, Tort Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2008), at 32-34 [hereinafter “Klar”].
70
Although they may be treated within the foregoing broader categories or as separate
elements, the concepts of reasonable foreseeability, proximity and remoteness are also part of any
ultimate determination of liability.
71
Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] S.C.J. No. 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79, at paras. 2124 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”].
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others. The first category consists of cases falling within the principle in
Rylands v. Fletcher72 (making a non-natural use of land which involves
bringing something onto the land known to do mischief if it escapes)
while the second involves cases where the plaintiff has been harmed by
the defendant’s dangerous animal (i.e., an animal of a type known to be
dangerous or an animal that has actually been dangerous in the past).73
These two categories are historical holdovers which the Canadian courts
have been unwilling to expand further.
Outside of these two narrow categories, Canadian tort law has consistently required either negligence or an intent to commit a tortious act
before an act or omission that causes damage can result in liability. In the
Ward case, Ontario argued that the carefully balanced fault-based rules
for determining when harm should result in legal liability which have
been incrementally developed over the past six centuries should not be
lightly discarded simply because the harm complained of may also be a
breach of the plaintiff’s Charter rights.

V. DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CHARTER LIABILITY
The Charter only applies to governments and governmental actors.
Allowing Charter damages to be awarded without proof of fault would
therefore impose a lower fault requirement when the defendant is a
governmental actor subject to the Charter than when the defendant is a
private actor.
In developing the principles of liability that apply with regard to particular Charter claims (claims relating to policy decisions, claims for
malicious prosecution and claims against the judiciary), the courts in
cases prior to Ward adopted the tort law fault principles that apply to the
same causes of action, recognizing that the public policy reasons why a
given degree of fault is required in tort law apply with equal force to
Charter-based claims.
1. Immunity from Liability for Policy Decisions
Even where there is sufficient proximity between a government action and an individual citizen to create a prima facie duty of care, the
72
73

(1868), 330 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (H.L.).
Id., at 339-40; Baker, supra, note 65, at 408 and 411; Klar, supra, note 69, at 619-20.
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courts have created a broad exception for policy decisions: “It is established that government actors are not liable in negligence for policy
decisions, but only operational decisions. The basis of this immunity is
that policy is the prerogative of the elected Legislature. It is inappropriate
for courts to impose liability for the consequence of a particular policy
decision.”74 Policy decisions are decisions based upon “financial,
economic, social or political factors or constraints”.75 Making governments liable for policy decisions risks interfering with effective governance
by deterring governments from creating new programs: “the Crown is
not a person and must be free to govern and make true policy decisions
without becoming subject to tort liability as a result of those decisions.”76
The courts have applied this principle to claims for damages in tort
cases and Charter cases, emphasizing fault as an integral element of
liability: “government policy by itself does not create a legally actionable
wrong. For that, the law requires specific wrongful acts causally connected to damage suffered.”77 Policy immunity is thus grounded in the
acknowledgment that liability for damages is neither just nor appropriate
in the absence of fault: “objective standards are notably lacking when the
question is not negligence but social wisdom, not due care but political
practicability, not reasonableness but economic expediency. Tort law
simply furnishes an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social,
political or economic decisions.”78
One of the policy concerns giving rise to this principle is the potentially vast scale of liability that a government would face if it were liable
for damages to all persons affected by a policy decision subsequently
declared to be invalid or constitutionally inadequate. As recognized by
the Supreme Court in Ward, exposing government to this level of
financial burden could have the effect of redirecting the expenditure of
public funds away from the restructuring and development of public
74

Cooper, supra, note 71, at para. 38.
Just v. British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 121, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, at 1239-45
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Just”].
76
Cooper, supra, note 71; Just, id.; Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation
and Highways), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, at 432-37 and 441 (S.C.C.); Edwards v. Law Society of Upper
Canada, [2001] S.C.J. No. 77, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, 2001 SCC 80, at paras. 14 and 19 (S.C.C.);
Mackin, supra, note 39, at para. 79; Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg (Metropolitan
Corporation), [1970] S.C.J. No. 102, [1971] S.C.R. 957, at 969 (S.C.C.).
77
Blackwater v. Plint, [2005] S.C.J. No. 59, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2005 SCC 58, at para. 9
(S.C.C.).
78
Just, supra, note 75, at 1240, citing Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, at 1170
(E.D. Penn. 1978).
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programs and institutions toward private individual redress for past acts
of government.79 It would expose government to “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”.80 As
Hogg and Monahan state:
If a decision at the planning level was made in breach of procedural
requirements, or in bad faith, or for an improper purpose, such a
decision would be held to be invalid by a Court. But it does not follow
that damages should be available to a person injured by the decision.
An award of damages would involve the court moving beyond the
infirmity of the actual decision and deciding what the “correct”
decision should have been. As well, an award of damages at the
planning level would often expose the public authority to a multiplicity
of lawsuits and intolerable financial burdens. These seem to be the
reasons why no common law duty of care arises at the planning level:
even an invalid decision at the planning level does not provide a cause
of action in negligence.81

Another reason for restricting the availability of compensatory damages for invalid government action is the impossibility of accurately
quantifying such damages. This is because assessing the loss attributable
to government action subsequently declared to be constitutionally
inadequate involves speculation as to what the government would have
done had it known that it could not proceed in the way it did. The
Supreme Court has recognized that it is not the function of the courts to
make ad hoc policy choices from a variety of constitutionally valid
options.82
The Courts have affirmed that governmental immunity from liability
for policy decisions applies regardless of whether the challenge to the
policy is based on tort or the Charter and have thus established a general
principle that declaratory relief should not be combined with pecuniary
damages in Charter claims. Where a government policy decision is at
79

Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 53.
Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd., [2010] S.C.J. No. 5, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 132, 2010
SCC 5, at para. 70 (S.C.C.), quoting Cardozo C.J.C. in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, at
444 (N.Y. 1931); Imperial Tobacco, supra, note 68, at paras. 97-101.
81
Hogg & Monahan, supra, note 6, at 165; see also Gosselin v. Québec, supra, note 5, at
para. 296, Bastarache J. dissenting; Design Services, supra, note 68, at paras. 59-66; Wynberg,
supra, note 40, at paras. 196-201.
82
Schachter, supra, note 9, at 707 and 726; Hogg & Monahan, id., at 165; M. v. H., [1999]
S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 142 (S.C.C.); Gosselin v. Quebec, id., at paras. 291, 295
and 298, Bastarache J. dissenting; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J.
No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at paras. 95-96 (S.C.C.).
80
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issue, the Courts have confirmed that “absent conduct that is clearly
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power, the courts will not award
damages …”.83 The Court applies the same legal principles of liability to
both tort and Charter claims because the public policy reasons for these
principles apply regardless of how the claim is pleaded. The fact that a
claim in damages arises from an alleged rights violation:
… does not oust those fundamental rules which serve to safeguard the
free and effective discharge of the legislative function. … By analogy,
in the law of Crown liability, if upon judicial review an administrative
decision is found to be unlawful, it does not necessarily follow that
there is a fault giving rise to recourse in civil liability [citations
omitted].84

2. Malicious Prosecution
In certain cases, public policy has led the courts to require a standard
of fault considerably higher than mere negligence before a plaintiff can
bring a private law action against a state actor. For example, in the tort of
malicious prosecution, the courts have, “in light of the unique role played
by Crown prosecutors in our modern system of public prosecution”,
concluded that “inexperience, incompetence, negligence, or even gross
negligence” are insufficient to impose liability on a Crown prosecutor.85
A Crown prosecutor can only be held liable for being malicious which
“requires a plaintiff to prove that the prosecutor wilfully perverted or
abused the office of the Attorney General or the process of criminal
justice”.86 The same standard applies regardless of whether the claim is
pleaded as the tort of malicious prosecution or as a claim that the
prosecution infringed the plaintiff’s section 7 rights as the Courts have
recognized that the same public policy concerns apply to both the tort
and the Charter claim. To require a lower standard of fault for the Charter
83

Mackin, supra, note 39, at para. 78
Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal), [2004] S.C.J. No. 25, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789, at paras. 19 and 22-23
(S.C.C.) (citations omitted); Schachter, supra, note 9, at 720; Mackin, id., at paras. 78-83; Wynberg,
supra, note 40, at paras. 191-202; R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, 2004
SCC 46, at para. 62 (S.C.C.).
85
Miazga, supra, note 8, at paras. 4 and 80; See also Osborne v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1996] O.J. No. 2678, at para. 14 (Ont. C.J.), affd [1998] O.J. No. 4457, at para. 2 (Ont. C.A.).
86
Miazga, id., at para. 80 (emphasis in original).
84
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claim would undermine the policy that requires a heightened degree of
fault for the tort.87
In Nelles,88 the majority held that prosecutorial immunity “ultimately
boils down to a question of policy” and emphasized the need “to ensure
that the Attorney General and Crown Attorneys will not be hindered in
the proper execution of their important public duties” in determining the
appropriate standard for liability.89 In her dissenting reasons, Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé cited a passage from American Justice Learned Hand,
warning that imposing liability on public officials whose mistakes caused
someone harm would:
… dampen the ardour of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and
again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be
founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find
himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must
indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to
their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as
have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from
their errors.90

In Miazga, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “the public good is
clearly served by the maintenance of a sphere of unfettered discretion
within which Crown attorneys can properly pursue their professional
goals.”91 Justice Charron, writing for a unanimous Court, spoke of the
need to protect prosecutorial independence:
Its fundamental importance lies, not in protecting the interests of
individual Crown attorneys, but in advancing the public interest by
enabling prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in fulfilment of
their professional obligations without fear of judicial or political
interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as “ministers of
justice” [citations omitted]. In R. v. Power, [citations omitted],
L’Heureux-Dubé J. acknowledged the importance of limiting judicial
oversight of Crown decisions in furtherance of the public interest:

87

Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Nelles”].
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id., at 199.
Id., at 222, citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, at 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
Miazga, supra, note 8, at para. 47.
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[T]he Attorney General is a member of the executive and as
such reflects, through his or her prosecutorial function, the
interest of the community to see that justice is properly done.
The Attorney General’s role in this regard is not only to protect
the public, but also to honour and express the community’s
sense of justice. Accordingly, courts should be careful before
they attempt to “second-guess” the prosecutor’s motives when
he or she makes a decision.92

Justice Charron pointed out that “the ‘inherent difficulty’ in proving
a case of malicious prosecution was an intentional choice by the
Court.”93 The Court in Ward recognized that the availability of Charter
damages should not undermine the “careful balancing” the Court
“established in Nelles and Proulx between the right of individual citizens
… and the public interest.”94 Otherwise, the high threshold for success in
a malicious prosecution action could be avoided by framing it as a
Charter claim.
In Nelles, Lamer J. made it clear that a claim for malicious prosecution
is, and should be, difficult to maintain and that if it could be established
the same facts could well support claims for a Charter breach, just as
the facts in the Doe case (supra) established a claim for negligence and
supported a corresponding claim for a Charter breach. To suggest that
where, in an action for malicious prosecution the facts did not support
the claim, a plea of breach of Charter Rights based upon the same facts
would act as a sort of fall-back position, would, in my view, render the
tort of malicious prosecution meaningless and deny the defendants the
protection implicit in the very high standards established by the Court
in Nelles.95

3. Judicial Immunity
In other cases, even a heightened fault requirement is insufficient to
protect public policy interests and complete immunity is required. For
example, members of the judiciary enjoy complete immunity from
a claim of damages in relation to the performance of their judicial
92

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 52.
94
Id.; Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 43.
95
Oniel v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 3840, at para. 51 (Ont.
Gen. Div.), revd on other grounds [2001] O.J. No. 90, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 59 (Ont. C.A.).
93
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functions. The courts at common law have understood judicial independence to be the cornerstone of an impartial judiciary, and it is this policy
concern that has informed the preservation of judicial immunity:
[T]he most serious consequence of permitting judges to be sued for
their decisions is that judicial independence would be severely
compromised. If judges recognized that they could be brought to
account for their decisions, their decisions might not be based on a
dispassionate appreciation of the facts and law related to the dispute.
Rather, they might be tempered by thoughts of which party would be
more likely to bring an action if they were disappointed by the result, or
by thoughts of whether a ground-breaking but just approach to a
difficult legal problem might be later impugned in an action for
damages against that judge, all of which would be raised by the mere
threat of litigation. In Lord Denning’s words, a judge would “turn the
pages of his books with trembling fingers, asking himself: ‘If I do this,
shall I be liable in damages?’”96

The public policy interest that gives rise to the need for judges to be
immune from damages in relation to the performance of their judicial
functions applies regardless of whether the cause of action is pleaded as a
tort or as a violation of the Charter. In fact, the Charter provides explicit
support for this “policy” interest in judicial independence, which is itself
entrenched as a Charter right:
Far from being inconsistent with the Constitution, the immunity rule
has, for several centuries, been considered an essential ingredient of the
constitutional principle of judicial independence. That principle,
inherited from the United Kingdom Constitution, was reflected in the
preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867, and it has been enshrined in the
Charter in the guarantee, under s. 11(d), of “a hearing before an
independent and impartial tribunal.” … The immunity rule, having as
its “raison d’être” the preservation of this important constitutional
principle, can hardly be characterized as inconsistent with the
Constitution.97
96
Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 268, [2000] 3 F.C.R. 298, at
para. 28 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 213 (S.C.C.); Morier v. Rivard,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 81, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 716, at 739 (S.C.C.); Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, at
136 (C.A.).
97
Royer v. Mignault, [1989] J.Q. no 407, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 345, at 359 (Que. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused [1988] 1 S.C.R. xiii (emphasis added). See, e.g., Atty-Gen. v. Chapman, [2011]
NZSC 110, where the majority of the New Zealand Supreme Court recently held that judicial
immunity and the separation of powers precluded an award of damages against either the individual
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If judicial immunity did not apply to claims for damages under the
Charter, judges might well find themselves liable to Charter damages,
particularly in criminal cases where trial judges must navigate the
complex and evolving jurisprudence relating to the legal rights and
protections guaranteed to accused persons by sections 7 to 14 of the
Charter. While incorrect judicial decisions may result in an infringement
of the accused’s Charter rights, the consistent remedy for such an error
has been a successful appeal, not the elimination of the doctrine of
judicial immunity or an entitlement to sue a judge for damages under
section 24(1) of the Charter.

VI. THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WARD IN CLAIMS
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
In order to understand the practical significance of the Ward decision,
we must first examine why plaintiffs seeking damages against government
often plead that the same allegations give rise to causes of action both in
tort and under the Charter. Ward is only significant to the extent that the
Charter claim is somehow different than the tort claim arising from the
same set of facts. There appear to be four reasons for this strategy, only
one of which remains an arguable proposition after Ward.
The first rationale for the practice of pleading both a tort and a Charter infringement is the hope that, if the plaintiff cannot prove all of the
elements of the tort claim, some of these elements (for example, negligence) will not be necessary to obtain damages under the Charter. On its
face, this seems to be the result in Ward, since the trial judge dismissed
the plaintiff’s negligence claim and the Supreme Court, without disturbing the trial judge’s finding on negligence, still awarded damages. Justice
Tysoe concluded that Mr. Ward had not proven two of the three elements
of the tort of negligence: “First, any duty owed by the City of Vancouver
and the Provincial Government was a duty owed to the general public
and was not a private law duty owed to Mr. Ward for the purposes of the
tort of negligence … Second, there was no evidence on the applicable
standard of care.”98 Mr. Ward did not appeal these findings and the
Supreme Court did not address them directly.
judge or the Crown where a judge’s actions had resulted in a breach of the claimant’s rights under
the New Zealand Bill of Rights.
98
Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 96.
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On closer examination, however, it is clear that, while the Supreme
Court does not conclude that the principles of tort liability will always be
applied to section 24(1) Charter claims, it is not prepared to abandon
these principles altogether. This ambivalence is most obvious at paragraph 43 of the decision, which states:
When appropriate, private law thresholds and defences may offer
guidance in determining whether s. 24(1) damages would be
“appropriate and just”. While the threshold for liability under the
Charter must be distinct and autonomous from that developed under
private law, the existing causes of action against state actors embody a
certain amount of “practical wisdom” concerning the type of situation
in which it is or is not appropriate to make an award of damages against
the state.99

Indeed, it appears that the Supreme Court did not agree with the findings of the trial judge with regard to either the duty of care or the
standard of care as the Supreme Court’s award of damages was premised
on an implied conclusion that there was both a private law duty of care
and conduct on the part of the jail guards that fell below the reasonable
standard of care. On the first point (the existence of a private law duty of
care), the trial judge’s decision was based on case law that was overruled
by the Supreme Court just a few months after his decision. In Hill v.
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board,100 the Supreme
Court held that investigating police officers do owe a private law duty
of care to suspects. Their conduct during an investigation should be
measured against the standard of how a reasonable officer in like
circumstances would have acted. Police officers may be accountable for
harm resulting to a suspect if they fail to meet this standard. The majority
described the standard of care as follows:
I conclude that the appropriate standard of care is the overarching
standard of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances. This
standard should be applied in a manner that gives due recognition to the
discretion inherent in police investigation. Like other professionals,
police officers are entitled to exercise their discretion as they see fit,
99
Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 43. Similar sentiments about the relevance of private law policy considerations are expressed at para. 22 of the decision: “However, the underlying
policy considerations that are engaged when awarding private law damages against state actors may
be relevant when awarding public law damages directly against the state. Such considerations may
be appropriately kept in mind.”
100
[2007] S.C.J. No. 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R.129, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”].
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provided that they stay within the bounds of reasonableness. The
standard of care is not breached because a police officer exercises his
or her discretion in a manner other than that deemed optimal by the
reviewing court. A number of choices may be open to a police officer
investigating a crime, all of which may fall within the range of
reasonableness. So long as discretion is exercised within this range, the
standard of care is not breached. The standard is not perfection, or even
the optimum, judged from the vantage of hindsight. It is that of a
reasonable officer, judged in the circumstances prevailing at the time
the decision was made — circumstances that may include urgency and
deficiencies of information. The law of negligence does not require
perfection of professionals; nor does it guarantee desired results …
Rather, it accepts that police officers, like other professionals, may
make minor errors or errors in judgment which cause unfortunate
results, without breaching the standard of care. The law distinguishes
between unreasonable mistakes breaching the standard of care and
mere “errors in judgment” which any reasonable professional might
have made and therefore, which do not breach the standard of care.101

While the trial judge in Ward found no evidence had been led regarding the applicable standard of care, the Supreme Court decision clearly
indicates that the Supreme Court concluded that the conduct of the
corrections officers did fall below the appropriate standard of care. The
Court stated:
The corrections officers’ conduct which caused the breach of Mr.
Ward’s Charter rights was also serious. Minimum sensitivity to
Charter concerns within the context of the particular situation would
have shown the search to be unnecessary and violative. Mr. Ward did
not commit a serious offence, he was not charged with an offence
associated with evidence being hidden on the body, no weapons were
involved and he was not known to be violent or to carry weapons. Mr.
Ward did not pose a risk of harm to himself or others, nor was there
any suggestion that any of the officers believed that he did. In these
circumstances, a reasonable person would understand that the
indignity resulting from the search was disproportionate to any benefit
which the search could have provided. In addition, without asking
officers to be conversant with the details of court rulings, it is not too
much to expect that police would be familiar with the settled law that
routine strip searches are inappropriate where the individual is being
held for a short time in police cells, is not mingling with the general
101

Id., at para. 73.
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prison population, and where the police have no legitimate concerns
that the individual is concealing weapons that could be used to harm
themselves or others.102

The italicized words in this paragraph look very much like the standard of care analysis set out in the Hill case, indicating that the Supreme
Court would have likely come to the same conclusion had the issue
before it been one of damages for negligence rather than under the
Charter. These were important factors in the Court’s decision, and it is, in
our view, unlikely that Charter damages would have been awarded had
the Court not found that the conduct of the corrections officers was
serious and fell below that of a “reasonable person” and, more specifically, below that of a reasonable corrections officer who would be
“familiar with the settled law”.
In addition, the Court in Ward reaffirmed its recent decision in Miazga that held that a claim of malicious prosecution against a Crown
Attorney requires proof of malice regardless of whether the claim is
brought in tort or under the Charter.103 Accordingly, Ward does not
support the proposition that claims for damages under section 24(1) of
the Charter will be easier to prove than the equivalent tort claims arising
from the same conduct.
The second reason for pleading both a tort and a Charter infringement is an effort to circumvent the government’s qualified immunity
from negligence claims for policy decisions.104 Plaintiffs hoped that by
adding a Charter claim to their allegation of negligence, the courts would
consider an award of damages in circumstances where the tort claim
would be dismissed. This strategy is particularly prevalent in proposed
class actions which are funded by contingency fees based on a percentage of the damages recovered. While there has been an increase in the
number of class actions brought against the government in the past few
years, many of these proposed actions have foundered on the wellestablished principle that government policy decisions are, in the absence
of bad faith or an abuse of power, immune from tort liability. Courts have
struck out several proposed class actions seeking damages for government policy decisions regarding funding for, for example, disabled

102
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104

Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 65 (emphasis added).
See notes 90-93, supra.
See 406-409, supra.
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children and health care.105 While the Crown has qualified immunity
from tort liability for policy decisions, such policy decisions are not
immune from Charter challenges. If plaintiffs could combine a Charter
challenge to government policy with a claim for damages, perhaps a
viable class action proceeding would be created.
As indicated above, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently
affirmed that the principle of qualified immunity for policy decisions
applies in the Charter context. While the validity of government policy
decisions are subject to judicial review under the Charter, the Court has
indicated that if the policy is found to infringe the Charter, the appropriate remedy is a declaration under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982
and not an individual remedy like damages under section 24(1) of the
Charter.106 This principle was confirmed again in the Ward case, although
the Court held that it did not apply to Mr. Ward’s claim because the
impugned conduct was not a “policy” or taken under a statute or policy
that was subsequently declared invalid.107 Accordingly, Ward did not
expand the scope for claiming damages in challenges to government
policy decisions or state conduct pursuant to a valid statute which is later
determined to be invalid and the qualified immunity applies regardless of
whether the claim is pleaded as negligence or a Charter violation.
The third reason for pleading both a tort and a Charter infringement
is the hope that damages might be multiplied by the addition of another
cause of action. Plaintiffs often claim damages for the tort claim and
additional damages for the alleged Charter breach. The Court in Ward
makes clear that double recovery will not be available in these cases:
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Laroza Estate v. Ontario, [2009] O.J. No. 1820, 95 O.R. (3d) 764 (Ont. C.A.); Abarquez
v. Ontario, [2009] O.J. No. 1814, 95 O.R. (3d) 414 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009]
S.C.C.A. No. 297 (S.C.C.); Williams v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 1819, 95 O.R.
(3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 298 (S.C.C.); Eliopoulos v.
Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care), [2006] O.J. No. 4400, 82 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont.
C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 514 (S.C.C.); L. (A.) v. Ontario (Minister of
Community and Social Services), [2006] O.J. No. 4673 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007]
S.C.C.A. No. 36 (S.C.C.); Sagharian (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Education),
[2008] O.J. No. 2009, 172 C.R.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No.
350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sagharian”]; Cilinger c. Quebec (Procureur général), [2004] J.Q. no
11627 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2004] C.S.C.R. No. 582 (S.C.C.).
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Schachter, supra, note 9, at para. 102; Guimond v. Québec (Attorney General), [1996]
S.C.J. No. 91, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 (S.C.C.); Mackin, supra, note 39; Wynberg, supra, note 40;
Sagharian, id.
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“[A] concurrent action in tort, or other private law claim, bars s. 24(1)
damages if the result would be double compensation.”108
The final reason for pleading both tort and Charter infringements
was an attempt to avoid the effect of limitation periods or notice requirements. Prior to the reform of limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002,109 tort actions against the Crown were subject to a sixmonth limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act.110
While the validity of the six-month limitation period was upheld in its
application to tort claims, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Prete v.
Ontario111 concluded that it was invalid in its application to Charter
claims.112 Indeed, the Court appeared to go further and hold that no
limitation period could apply to claims brought under section 24(1) of
the Charter. Accordingly, while a tort action for malicious prosecution
had to be commenced within the six-month period, a claim against the
same conduct based on section 7 of the Charter was apparently not
subject to any limitation period but only to the doctrine of laches.
While other courts in Canada accepted the principle that the government should not be permitted to immunize itself against Charter damages
claims by imposing special shorter limitation periods that were uniquely
favourable to the government, they held that statutory limitation periods
of general application did apply to claims for damages pursuant to
section 24(1) of the Charter.113 In Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New
Brunswick (Finance),114 the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that
general limitation periods are applicable to restitutionary claims based on
the return of moneys collected under constitutionally invalid legislation
108

Id., at para. 36. See also para. 59: “It may be useful to consider the tort claim first, since
if it meets the objects of Charter damages, recourse to s. 24(1) will be unnecessary.”
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S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, s. 25.
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R.S.O. 1990, c. P.38, s. 7.
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[1993] O.J. No. 2794, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 94 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Prete”].
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See also Ayangma v. Prince Edward Island Eastern School Board, [2000] P.E.I.J. No. 50,
187 D.L.R. (4th) 304, at para. 10 (P.E.I.C.A.).
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[1988] J.Q. no 56 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1988] C.S.C.R. No. 138 (S.C.C.); St-Onge v.
Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1523 (F.C.A.); Pearson v. Canada, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1175 (F.C.T.D.),
affd [2007] F.C.J. No. 1598 (F.C.A.) (although the limitations issue was not dealt with by the
F.C.A.); Zadworny v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2007] M.J. No. 413, at paras. 11-13 (Man.
C.A.); Garry v. Canada, [2007] A.J. No. 761, at para. 21 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007]
S.C.C.A. No. 546 (S.C.C.); Hamm v. Canada, [2007] F.C.J. No. 801, at paras. 55 and 63 (F.C.T.D.),
affd [2008] F.C.J. No. 609 (F.C.A.).
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and that the application of the limitation period did not constitute an
impermissible attempt by government to immunize itself.115
In Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan,116 the Supreme Court extended this
principle to an action for damages under section 24(1) of the Charter. The
Court stated:
The argument that The Limitation of Actions Act does not apply to
personal claims was abandoned before us, counsel for the appellant
conceding that The Limitations of Actions Act applies to such
claims. This is consistent with this Court’s decision in Kingstreet
Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 3, which held that limitation periods apply to claims for
personal remedies that flow from the striking down of an
unconstitutional statute.117

While limitation periods of general application apply to personal
damage claims made pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter, they do not
apply to actions for declarations under s. 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982.118 Actions for declarations may be commenced so long as the
statute is extant. If the statute is repealed its constitutional validity will
generally be moot regardless of how much time has passed. The issue of
whether an in rem declaration will have any retroactive effect is a matter
to be determined by the Court in a manner consistent with the principles
set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hislop119 and may be subject
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Id., at paras. 13 and 59-61. The issue in Kingstreet related to a taxing statute that was
found to infringe s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 because it was a tax
disguised as a licence fee. See Eurig, supra, note 1.
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Id., at para. 17.
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intervener the Attorney General of Ontario:
Where legislation is found to be unconstitutionally underinclusive, the prospective remedial option chosen by the court might extend the benefit at issue through severance or
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government to determine whether to cancel, modify, or extend the benefit at issue. If the
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eligible person [in the claimant group], reaps the benefit of the s. 52(1) declaration, even
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Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, 2007
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to statutory rules limiting the period for which retroactive payment of
benefits may be made or refunds collected.120
Following Ravndahl, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Alexis v.
Darnley121 acknowledged that Prete’s obiter comments regarding general
limitation periods could not stand.122 The Court concluded: “In my view,
therefore, the Supreme Court’s reasons clearly signal that limitation
periods of general application will apply to claims made under section
24(1) of the Charter that are, ‘brought as an individual for personal
remedy.’”123
Accordingly, since most short limitation periods applicable only to
the government, including the six-month limitation period in the Public
Authorities Protection Act, were repealed in 2002 and replaced with the
general two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002, the
decision in Prete has now been virtually eclipsed, and claims for section
24(1) damages brought in Ontario will be subject to the same limitation
period as tort claims arising for the same conduct.

VII. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DAMAGES AND DECLARATIONS
This last point — the distinction between monetary payments resulting from declarations of invalidity and damages — often causes some
analytical confusion and merits further discussion. It is sometimes
suggested that monetary payments resulting from declarations of invalidity are the equivalent of damages, and are awarded without a showing of
fault. Yet while money is money, and the monetary payments resulting
from declarations of invalidity may far exceed any money ordered in
damages, such monetary payments are analytically distinct from money
paid as damages.
Damages are amounts calculated and awarded by a court to compensate an individual for an injury or other wrong.124 A claim for damages is
a claim for a personal remedy and only the plaintiffs to the action are
entitled to that remedy. While declarations of invalidity may result in the
120
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return of money (when the statutory authorization to collect a tax or fee
is declared invalid) or result in the retroactive or prospective payment of
money (when the declaration expands the statutory entitlement or
eligibility to receive a government payment or other benefit), the amount
of money paid or refunded is based on the operation of the statute as it
reads subsequent to the declaration. The commencement or duration of
the payment will depend on whether the declaration is suspended or
given retroactive effect, but the quantum is based on the statute.
A declaration that a statutory provision is invalid is an in rem remedy
and not a personal remedy. While the effect of such a declaration of
invalidity may be that the plaintiff (and all others subject to the same
law) gains a statutory entitlement to a particular benefit, this is not a
personal remedy, but is the consequence of a change in the legislation
affected by the declaration. Where a declaration is granted which, for
example, extends a statutory benefit, the natural operation of the law as
declared renders it unnecessary and redundant to also order a personal
remedy.125
Another important difference between damages and a declaration is
that the damage order is determinative of the amount of money that the
plaintiff will receive, whereas the monetary value of a declaration is
almost always subject to subsequent legislative amendments. If, for
example, the Court awards a plaintiff $100,000 in damages under section
24(1) of the Charter, there may be no unilateral action that the government can take to reduce or eliminate that entitlement. Legislation
purporting to nullify or reduce a section 24(1) damages award, for
example, would likely infringe the Charter.
Where the Court issues a declaration under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the precise contours of the declaration will be determined by the Court using the principles developed in Schachter and
Hislop, with reference to the nature of the violation and the context of the
specific legislative provisions under consideration. Where legislation is
found to be unconstitutionally underinclusive, the prospective remedial
option chosen by the Court might extend the benefit at issue through
severance or reading in.126 If the benefit is extended by declaration, the
125

See notes 39, 45, 53, supra.
The Court might also suspend the operation of the declaration of invalidity to allow the
government to cancel, modify or extend the benefit at issue. The prospective value of the benefit will
then depend on the option chosen by the Legislature to comply with the principles set out in the
Court’s decision.
126
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Charter claimant, like any otherwise eligible person, reaps the benefit of
that declaration. But the declaration is not necessarily the final word,
because the legislature retains the power to subsequently cancel, modify
or extend the benefit at issue. The future value of any statutory benefit is
always subject to the power of the Legislature (or the Executive in the
case of a regulation) to decrease, increase or eliminate the benefit, so
long as the changes are themselves consistent with the Charter. The
courts have no authority to immunize any plaintiff from subsequent
legislative amendments.
Under certain circumstances, unconstitutional legislation can even be
replaced by constitutional legislation, which, if made retroactive, will
negate any refund that would have otherwise flowed from the declaration. For example, where a statutory fee is declared to be unconstitutional
on the basis that it is actually a tax, the fee/taxpayer would generally be
entitled to a refund since the fee/tax was taken without statutory authority.127 The Supreme Court of Canada has, however, confirmed the power
of the Legislature to impose retroactive taxes to correct any deficiency in
the previous statute and a properly drafted retroactive tax would enable
the government to retain the money previously collected.128

VIII. FORUM AND PROCEDURE
Just as Ward will likely not lead to substantively different results in
Charter damage claims than those obtained in tort claims, it also will
likely not lead to the creation of new procedures for seeking damages
from the government. The Supreme Court made it clear that the “procedural requirements associated with existing remedies are crafted to
achieve a proper balance between public and private interests, and the
underlying policy considerations of these requirements should not be
negated by recourse to s. 24(1) of the Charter. As stated earlier, s. 24(1)
operates concurrently with, and does not replace, the general law.”129
Thus the rules of civil procedure, including, for example, the filing of a
statement of claim and rules regarding discovery, as well as the notice
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requirements of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act,130 will continue
to apply to Charter damage claims.
Many findings of a Charter breach are made in criminal proceedings,
most of which are heard in provincial courts. To date, the remedy
awarded for such a breach has usually been a procedural remedy such as
the exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings. The Ward case
indicates that where such remedies are available, they will generally
suffice to vindicate the Charter right, and damages will not be appropriate under the third step of the Ward analysis.131 Assuming that a claim for
Charter damages is made, however, does Ward authorize criminal courts
to consider awarding Charter damages under section 24(1)? In Ward, the
Supreme Court indicated its intention that a claim for damages should
follow the existing rules of civil procedure and should be commenced in
the court “which by statute or inherent jurisdiction has the power to
award damages”.132 Provincial criminal courts “are not so empowered
and thus do not have the power to award damages under s. 24(1)”.133
This echoes earlier cases in which the Supreme Court held that criminal
courts do not have jurisdiction to award Charter damages in a criminal
proceeding.134 Criminal proceedings are designed to determine whether
130
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 7(1). A notice is required whether the action is a common law
action or an action based on breach of Charter rights: Deep v. Park, [2001] O.J. No. 6122 (Ont.
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an accused is guilty of a crime and accordingly have a higher standard of
proof and greater procedural protections for the accused (for example,
the right not to testify). Whether damages are an appropriate remedy for
a Charter breach is more appropriately determined in civil proceedings
where the state has the right to test the claimant’s case by disclosure of
documents, examinations for discovery and the power to compel the
claimant to answer questions even if they would have incriminated the
claimant in criminal proceedings.135 Civil courts will therefore likely
remain the forum for determining whether Charter damages should be
awarded as a section 24(1) remedy.

IX. CONCLUSION
At first glance, Ward seems to have created a parallel system of “tort
lite” — a means for tort claimants who have somehow been unable to
prove all aspects of their claim to have another chance under the Charter.
In practice, however, we do not believe that Ward will result in a radical
expansion of governmental liability beyond that already provided by the
law of tort.
In the vast majority of cases, claimants will likely bring a concurrent
tort action as well, whether because they want to sue individuals involved directly136 or because they do not want to risk putting all of their
eggs in one Charter basket. In most of those cases, it will be unnecessary
to even consider whether Charter damages should be awarded. If the tort
claim is made out, the principle against double recovery will preclude a
separate award of Charter damages. And in many of the cases where the
facts do not show a tort has occurred, they also will not disclose a breach
of the claimant’s Charter rights that could give rise to a remedy under
section 24(1).
Those who hoped that Ward would turn the Charter into a font of
public law damages will be disappointed by the Court’s analysis. While
the principles for awarding public law damages against the state may one
It is the jurisdictional function that the respective court is discharging that governs this
principle, not whether it is capable of discharging another at some other time under its
mandate. It is the mix of criminal functions and remedies with those of civil that is discouraged to the point of being prevented.
135
R. v. McGillivary, [1990] N.B.J. No. 324 (N.B.C.A.).
136
Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 22: “Actions against individual actors should be
pursued in accordance with existing causes of action.”
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day diverge from the principles for awarding private law damages
against state actors, this has not happened yet.

